Although the main research topic of this book is the German legal language, it should be noted in the context of synonymy that the English legal language tends to accumulate various more or less synonymous terms, for example in relation to a will as in the following example: I N.N.1, sane of mind and body, hereby gives all my property to N.N.2, invent and bequeath. «Invent» and «bequeath» are more or less synonymous with «giving» [something by will to another], even though the first two verbs were originally used in different contexts, for example, «invent» in the context of the mortgage as opposed to «bequeath» in the context of giving personal property by will to another. The three different verbs are used to indicate that all property, real, personal and monetary, must be inherited. The following section focuses on legal translations, building on the discussion above about what constitutes legal language and how legal interpretation is (or should be) used. I agree with Šarčević (1997: 92) that it is certainly not for the translator to resolve an ambiguity in the source text, as this would be an act of interpretation reserved exclusively for the judge. It is generally accepted that polysemy in legal language is the rule rather than the exception: for illustrative purposes, the central term of law in German legal language[7] (in the broadest sense) refers to two different concepts: (1) //legal system// (/das Recht/) and (2) //subjective right// (/droit/). In the German legal system, the grammatical method enjoys a certain priority, as evidenced by the following decision of the BGH: Abstraction disappears only when the corresponding legal provision is applied to a specific case and the court has to explain why a certain act is covered by the term in question, i.e. taking into account the context. According to Engberg (2002: 375), legal translation is a particular communication activity in the legal field. This activity is carried out for legal purposes and in legal environments. I refer to the discussion on the pragmatic aspects of legal language (section 2). Typically, at least two parties are involved in the communication, each of them as sender or recipient.

In contrast, translation involves the translator as the person in the middle or «information broker» (Obenaus 1995: 250), who is both recipient and sender because the translator first receives the source text, which must be understood and/or interpreted, the difference being explained above. At the same time, however, the translator is also the sender when sending his translation to the intended final recipient. The translator must be on the continuum from expert to non-expert. Of course, you can`t expect a translator to have the same level of legal knowledge if they`re not a lawyer. At the same time, I maintain that it is not possible to translate «for legal purposes and in legal environments» (Engberg 2002: 375) without a minimum understanding of the legal systems involved. How to delineate the minimum of insight is ultimately a practical question. The aim of this article is to enhance existing knowledge about the complex relationship between legal language, legal interpretation and legal translation that challenges participants with a communication situation specific to a particular field. This situation can be described as a complex communicative-cognitive procedure that takes into account a pragmatic approach to reach its recipients on a continuum from laymen to experts. Apparent correspondence with the general purpose language (LGP) In the following, I briefly comment on these characteristics, taking into account the German legal language (usage). Much less attention is paid to Norwegian legal language (usage) because, to my knowledge, there is a fairly rare literature on the subject. [3] Two parties had signed a contract for the construction of an industrial building on one of their neighbouring parcels, in which the wall facing the other owner`s land was to be erected without windows.

In the appeal proceedings, the BGH had to decide whether that contract had been infringed because the defendant had nevertheless made openings in the wall and filled them with glass blocks, those openings with glass blocks to be classified as windows. The lower court, the Higher Regional Court, denied on appeal that the defendant`s conduct could be considered contrary to the contract and argued that openings with glass blocks could not be considered «windows» within the meaning of the contract wording. On the other hand, the BGH, the highest court for such cases, argued that, depending on the importance of windows in everyday language, their transmission of light was decisive. The court referred to §§ 133, 157 BGB. The openings filled with glass bricks have been interpreted by this courtyard as synonymous with windows. In view of the wording of the «no windows» contract, the BGH therefore ruled in favour of the plaintiff. [12] I use legal language as a special language service provider (Kurzon, 1997; Tiersma, 1999; Tiersma and Solan 2012) and examine from a pragmatic perspective their interdependence with legal interpretation as a prerequisite for legal translations. Empirical data come exclusively from written texts[2] with a particular focus on comprehension and communication in intercultural contexts. A growing interest in special-purpose language (SPL) research and specialized discourse is currently evident in a large number of publications.

For the purposes of this article, the exploration of legal language as a particular PSL in various interdisciplinary contexts, such as the work of Kischel (2009), Goddard (2010), Poscher (2012), Engberg (2012), Bix (2012) and Mattila (2013) is of particular interest. The (legal) interpretation, or more precisely the interpretation of legal texts, which the judge must make, is «mainly a search for contextual meaning in order to know the consequences of the text in the legal situation in which the interpretation takes place» (Engberg 2002: 375, emphasis added). The judge must justify his interpretation of the outcome of the decision (Christensen and Sokolowski 2002:74) and is therefore no longer considered a mouth of the law (Montesquieu), on the assumption that words have a relatively stable and ready-made meaning to which he can easily refer. Busse (2002: 142) argues convincingly that the interpretation of the law has little in common with the activity of `interpretation` in the philological sense, since the implications to be drawn from it represent concrete decision-making actions (Busse 2002: 142). [11] This seems logical, since the judge must end the case with his verdict, either by finding a person guilty or not guilty, with the consequences that follow. This section focuses on legal methodology in relation to interpreting in an intra- and interlingual environment. However, let me begin with some generally accepted ideas about the relationship between law and language, that is, language is inextricably linked to law, which in turn is expressed in linguistic terms. (Natural) Language is often vague and inherently an imprecise, imperfect and ambiguous instrument[9] (Tremblay 2006: 113) and the following questions arise: How can legal language be an appropriate instrument to convey what legislators and judges want to convey? Is legal language really readily available, and if not, how does interpretation come into play? What is meant by «interpretation»[10] in this context? These questions are closely interrelated and a separate answer to each is highly problematic. This example shows once again how the interpretation of the law can reveal the vagueness of a particular concept according to a particular field or branch of law and clarify its polysemy when the legislator seems to use the same term but with a different content («meaning»).

The translator must keep this in mind and must be aware of the translation strategies to overcome this challenge. For this example, Section 233 of the Norwegian Civil Criminal Code (straffeloven) uses andens («another person») instead of the possible expression menneske. For the purposes of this Article, the emphasis shall be on the German legal language or the legal language in the Federal Republic of Germany and shall not take into account other German-speaking countries. In addition, studies of the English legal language are considered to some extent due to the dominant role of English in the scientific community. The following example comes from a completely different context, namely extracts from a Norwegian court decision that had to be translated by candidates for the national accreditation examination for translations (translatøreksamen). This example questioned, among other things, the candidate`s (legal) knowledge of a particular term to be used. Candidates do not have access to the Internet, but can use all possible translation tools such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, general information and/or glossaries downloaded to their laptop.